Afghanistan Redux

Monday 7 September 2009
1730

The Ghilzaie Chief wrote answer “Our paths are narrow and steep,
“ The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep;
…” So a stranger needs safe escort, and the oath of a valiant friend .”
The Amir’s Message, Sir Alfred Lyall, 1882.

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
- George Santayana

I have just finished reading a very interesting, instructive, and provocative book entitled “The Story of the Malakand Field Force – An Episode of Frontier War” by Sir Winston Churchill. It was his very first book, written in 1897 when he was a 22 year old subaltern (lieutenant). The subject of the book is the British expedition to put down the 1897 rebellion by the mountain tribes in the northwest frontier region of India. This area is now part of the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, directly bordering Afghanistan. It also happens to be one of the critical areas in which we are currently engaged against Al Queda and the Taliban. For that reason this book should be of particular interest to anyone interested in the current war in Afghanistan – yet I have not seen it on any COIN reading lists or mentioned in any anthologies. I found it quite by accident, while looking for something else.

I bought a printed copy of the book, but later discovered that it is out of copyright and is available for free: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9404

The book is an absolute gem – a gold mine; I hardly know where to start. I suppose a bit of historical context is in order, following which I will summarize or excerpt the book’s high points, generally following the path of the author’s narrative. I’ll probably use quotations too extensively, but Churchill’s command of English was so complete and his writing so eloquent that it seems a shame, almost a crime, to try to shorten or paraphrase it.

The general context of the conflict was the resistance of the mountain tribes to the British Imperial Government’s so-called “Forward Policy”. For many years the boundary of the British Empire in India had been considered to be the edge of the mountains. The British were content to control the plains of India, and regarded the mountainous regions to the north and west as natural borders against Russian and Afghan incursion. A series of events caused them to re-evaluate this policy in 1879 and decide to push out into the mountains, and to control the entire drainage system of the Indus. Following that, they decided that they had to control the mountain passes as well, which led them to push towards Gilgit, Chitral, Jelalabad, and Kandahar. These incursions were naturally seen as a threat by the mountain tribes (primarily Pashtuns), who resisted fiercely, and finally commenced a general uprising in 1897. This book is the story of one particular expedition in that broader conflict, in which Churchill was a participant. His first-hand observations and reflections should be of interest to us today – “plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose”.

The first chapter is entitled “The Theatre of War”, and contains a description of the terrain as well as a number of cogent observations about the people of the region:

“Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughout the land…Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger…To the ferocity of the Zulu are added the craft of the Redskin and the marksmanship of the Boer. “

“Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder among men, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence…In such a state of society, all property is held directly by main force. Every man is a soldier.”

“This state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which recks little of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with careless levity, and the tribesmen of the Afghan border afford the spectacle of a people, who fight without passion, and kill one another without loss of temper.”

“Their system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather than vices, has produced a code of honour so strange and inconsistent, that it is incomprehensible to a logical mind. I have been told that if a white man could grasp it fully, and were to understand their mental impulses—if he knew, when it was their honour to stand by him, and when it was their honour to betray him; when they were bound to protect and when to kill him—he might, by judging his times and opportunities, pass safely from one end of the mountains to the other. But a civilised European is… little able to accomplish this…”

“All are held in the grip of miserable superstition… a state of mental development at which civilisation hardly knows whether to laugh or weep.”

“Their superstition exposes them to the rapacity and tyranny of a numerous priesthood—"Mullahs," "Sahibzadas," "Akhundzadas," "Fakirs,"—and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms, who…live free at the expense of the people.”

Churchill uses the second chapter to describe the initial dispositions of British outposts, supply lines, and military forces. Chapter 3, “The Outbreak” describes the beginning of the uprising:

“… a single class had viewed with quick intelligence and intense hostility the approach of the British power. The priesthood of the Afghan border instantly recognised the full meaning of the Chitral road. The cause of their antagonism is not hard to discern. Contact with civilisation assails the ignorance, and credulity, on which the wealth and influence of the Mullah depend.”

Throughout Churchill’s detailed descriptions of the various signs that trouble was brewing (but which were either unobserved or underappreciated by the government), the theme that emerges is that the average Westerner simply does not understand and cannot fully appreciate the way these people think. Their warlike nature, the extraordinary influence of their religious leaders, and the inscrutability of their shifting loyalties, alliances, and vendettas made what we would now call the “human terrain” every bit as forbidding and difficult to navigate as the steep mountains, deep rivers, and burning valleys of their country. The stage was set for a bloody conflict.

Chapters 4 through 16 are a detailed account of the military campaign, with many and specific episodes of long marches, sharp encounters, advance and retreat, triumph and disaster. It was as exciting and engaging to read as a novel, with the added attraction of being a true account of conflict in places where our enemies currently operate – the Swat Valley, Malakand, Mohmand, Baujaur… I read it with great interest as military history but also as an exercise in current professional development. While many of the specific tactical lessons are dated, the general principles are not. It seems to me that it would be of little value to describe the specific battles here, but I made a few notes in the margins when I thought that his observations might illuminate some enduring lesson:

On the death of a young officer: “Fortune (is) never so capricious as on the field of battle…”

On the ruins of an earlier, peaceful civilization that had thriven in the region in about the 5th century, at a time when Rome was being overrun by the Visigoths, Huns, and Vandals : “When we reflect on the revolutions which time effects, and observe how the home of learning and progress changes as the years pass by, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, perhaps a mournful one, that the sun of civilisation can never shine all over the world at once.”

Apologizing to the reader for including in his account the details of long dusty marches and camp routine, he says: “…he who would obtain a true idea of the soldier's life on service, must mentally share the fatigues of the march and the monotony of the camp. The fine deeds, the thrilling moments of war, are but the high lights in a picture, of which the background is routine, hard work, and discomfort.”

On the valley of the Jabdul: “This valley may, in natural and political features, be taken as typical of the Afghan valleys. Seven separate castles formed the strongholds of seven separate khans… It is ‘all against all,’ in these valleys…”

On the practicality of making alliances with local tribes: “As long as they fight, these Afghans do not mind much on which side they fight. There are worse men and worse allies helping us to-day.”

On the reliability of the locals: “Our guide meanwhile squatted on the ground and pronounced the names of all the villages, as each one was pointed at. To make sure there was no mistake, the series of questions was repeated. This time he gave to each an entirely different name with an appearance of great confidence and pride…”

To my surprise and delight, I ran across a famous Churchill quote, for which I now know the source and context: “Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.”

On mountain warfare: “It is impossible to realise without seeing, how very slowly troops move on hillsides.”

On the dangers inherent in withdrawals: “…while it is usually easy to advance against an Asiatic, all retirements are matters of danger.” This comment was one among many descriptions of the way in which the mountain tribesmen would give ground when pressed, but would pounce immediately upon any sign of British retreat or withdrawal, and harass a returning patrol right to the gates of the camp.

“Among Europeans power provokes antagonism, and weakness excites pity. All is different in the East. Beyond Suez the bent of men's minds is such, that safety lies only in success, and peace in prosperity. All desert the falling. All turn upon the fallen.”

This aspect of the character of the mountain tribes bears further emphasis – their system of ethics is completely different than ours; they respect only power and strength:

“The reader may have been struck, in the account of the fighting in the Mamund Valley, with the vigour with which the tribesmen follow up a retreating enemy and press an isolated party. In war this is sound, practical policy. But the hillmen adopt it rather from a natural propensity, than from military knowledge. Their tactics are the outcome of their natures. All their actions, moral, political, strategic, are guided by the same principle. The powerful tribes, who had watched the passage of the troops in sullen fear, only waited for a sign of weakness to rise behind them. As long as the brigades dominated the country, and appeared confident and successful, their communications would be respected, and the risings localised; but a check, a reverse, a retreat would raise tremendous combinations on every side. “

Churchill then goes on to explain how the way in which a local uprising is dealt with is relevant to the fate of the rest of the British Empire:

“If the reader will bear this in mind, it will enable him to appreciate the position with which this chapter deals, and may explain many other matters which are beyond the scope of these pages. For it might be well also to remember, that the great drama of frontier war is played before a vast, silent but attentive audience, who fill a theatre, that reaches from Peshawar to Colombo, and from Kurrachee to Rangoon. “

On the tribesmen's reaction to proffered aid: “Sir Bindon Blood offered them medical aid for their wounded, but this they declined. They could not understand the motive, and feared a stratagem.”

Commenting upon some confusion and conflict resulting from inconsistent policies: “The political officers must be under the control of the General directing the operations. There must be no ‘Imperium in imperio.’ In a Field Force one man only can command—and all in it must be under his authority. Differences, creating difficulties and leading to disasters, will arise whenever the political officers are empowered to make arrangements with the tribesmen, without consulting and sometimes without even informing the man on whose decisions the success of the war and the lives of the soldiers directly depend. “

Chapter 17 is entitled “Military Observations”. Here Churchill reviews and summarizes the more important observations and lessons of a strictly military nature:

“The first and most important consideration is transport. Nobody who has not seen for himself can realise what a great matter this is…In these valleys, where wheeled traffic is impossible, the difficulties and cost of moving supplies are enormous; and as none, or very few, are to be obtained within the country, the consideration is paramount.”

“…all the fighting occurred in capturing villages, which lay in rocky and broken ground in the hollows of the mountains, and were defended by a swarm of active riflemen…The tribesmen would dart from rock to rock, exposing themselves only for an instant, and before the attention of a section could be directed to them and the rifles aimed, the chance and the target would have vanished together… speaking generally, infantry should push on to the attack with the bayonet without wasting much time in firing, which can only result in their being delayed under the fire of a well-posted enemy. “

“As the enemy seize every point as soon as it is left, all retirements should be masked by leaving two or three men behind from each company. These keep up a brisk fire, and after the whole company have taken up a new position, or have nearly done so, they run back and join them. Besides this, the fire of one company in retiring should always be arranged to cover another, and at no moment in a withdrawal should the firing ever cease. The covering company should be actually in position before the rear company begins to move, and should open fire at once.”

“The necessity for having the officers in the same dress as the men, was apparent to all who watched the operations… at close quarters the keen-eyed tribesmen always made an especial mark of the officers, distinguishing them chiefly, I think, by the fact that they do not carry rifles.”

“The fatigues experienced by troops in mountain warfare are so great, that every effort has to be made to lighten the soldier's load. At the same time the more ammunition he carries on his person the better.”

“Great efforts should be made to give the soldier a piece of chocolate, a small sausage, or something portable and nutritious to carry with him to the field. In a war of long marches, of uncertain fortunes, of retirements often delayed and always pressed, there have been many occasions when regiments and companies have unexpectedly had to stop out all night without food. It is well to remember that the stomach governs the world.”

“…the enemy do not become formidable until a mistake has been made.”

“The terrible losses inflicted on the tribesmen in the Swat Valley show how easily disciplined troops can brush away the bravest savages in the open. But on the hillside all is changed, and the observer will be struck by the weakness rather than the strength of modern weapons. Daring riflemen, individually superior to the soldiers, and able to support the greatest fatigues, can always inflict loss, although they cannot bar their path.”

“The military problem…presented in the Afghan valleys; a roadless, broken and undeveloped country; an absence of any strategic points; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerilla tactics. The results…are, that the troops can march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy; and that all their movements must be attended with loss.“

“This has been perhaps a cold-blooded chapter. We have considered men as targets; tribesmen, fighting for their homes and hills, have been regarded only as the objective of an attack; killed and wounded human beings, merely as the waste of war…but practical people in a business-like age will remember that they live in a world of men—not angels—and regulate their conduct accordingly. “

Given our own current situation in Afghanistan, it seems appropriate to close my entry with some of Churchill’s own closing words:

“We are at present in a transition stage, nor is the manner nor occasion of the end in sight. Still this is no time to despair. I have often noticed in these Afghan valleys, that they seem to be entirely surrounded by the hills, and to have no exit. But as the column has advanced, a gap gradually becomes visible and a pass appears. Sometimes it is steep and difficult, sometimes it is held by the enemy and must be forced, but I have never seen a valley that had not a way out. That way we shall ultimately find, if we march with the firm but prudent step of men who know the dangers; but, conscious of their skill and discipline, do not doubt their ability to deal with them as they shall arise.”

Mood: Calm & Confident
Music: Mozart – Clarinet Quintets